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LIABILITY FOR GLOBAL NAVIGATION 
SATELLITE SERVICES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF GPS AND GALILEO 
Frans G. uon der Dunk* 
I. INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SERVICES 
AND LIABILITY 
The law relating to global navigation satellite systems, 
(GNSS) is a novel and complex subject. As a result, this paper 
addresses a considerable number of issues from a new, as of yet 
untested legal perspective. It will also address a number of alto- 
gether new issues which, from a legal perspective, have been 
dealt with often in other areas of law. 
Global navigation satellite systems are being used for a 
very rapidly growing plethora of applications and, thus, also 
cause a rapidly growing plethora of legal issues to arise. These 
range from general institutional and jurisdictional ones, to such 
concrete aspects as certification, security, intellectual property 
rights and data protection. These issues, moreover, firstly, in- 
terplay with each other; secondly, do so at  various levels (inter- 
national/global, to some extent European, that is European 
Community, and national); and thirdly, do so in a number of 
respects across a number of economic sectors, transport and 
non-transport. 
To address relevant legal issues, this paper will lay out the 
essence of a global navigation satellite system, how it basically 
operates at an abstract and non-technical level, and then will 
chart specific legal ramifications onto this analysis. 
The first economic sector to acknowledge the potential 
benefits of global navigation satellite systems (timing, position- 
ing and navigation-related services) was indeed a transport sec- 
- 
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tor: aviation. In 1983 the International Civil Aviation Organi- 
sation (ICAO) established a Committee on Future Air Naviga- 
tion Systems (FANS)' which inter alia was to identify possible 
benefits, risks and drawbacks of the use of global navigation 
satellite systems for aviation purposes, and came forward with 
recommendations for dealing with them properly.2 
Concurrently, because of the high degree of safety- 
sensitivity in the aviation sector, it quickly became clear that 
one of the major issues would be that of liability: who pays for 
the damage in case an aircraft accident is ultimately caused by 
wrongful or absent navigation information at  a critical point in 
flight operations? 
For example, efforts have been made at  least in writing to 
establish liability for such damage on the basis of the Conven- 
tion on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Ob- 
jects (Liability C~nvention)~, as constituting "damage caused by 
[a] space obje~t" .~ Others contended that air law would be the 
more appropriate place to establish liability - if any - as resting 
upon the providers of the relevant satellite signals, leading 
some to further conclude that indeed no such direct liability ex- 
isted in the first place.5 
' See e.g. in extenso BOAKYE DANQUAH KOFI HENAKU, THE LAW ON GLOBAL AIR 
NAVIGATION BY SATELLITE: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ICAO CNSIATM 
SYSTEM, (AST Law Monographs, Leiden 1998). 
Later, the FANS-concept evolved into the more encompassing one of Communica- 
tion, Navigation and SurveillancelAir Traffic Management (CNSIATM), and inter alia a 
Legal Technical Expert Panel (LTEP) was established to make sure all relevant legal 
aspects were considered. Also, efforts were made in the ICAO Standards and Recom- 
mended Practices (SARPs) to accommodate the possible usage of GNSS. 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29,1972,24 U.S.T. 2389,961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
' Id. at  art. 11. See also Henaku, supra note I ,  a t  221. 
"ee Michael Milde, Air Navigation and Safety: Institutional and Legal Problems 
of the Global Navigation Satellite System, IV TEMAS DE AVIACI6N COMERCIAL Y 
DERECHO AERONAUTICO Y ESPACIAL 134-5 (2000). It may be noted here, that under Art. 
20(2) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw 
Convention], "negligent pilotage or negligence in the handling of the aircraft or in navi- 
gation", did relieve the carrier of liability. Whereas, under Art. X of the Protocol to 
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car- 
riage by Air Signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929, Od. 28, 1955,478 U.N.T.S. 371 [herein- 
after Hague Protocol], this provision was not maintained. 
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Currently, there are two global navigation systems in exis- 
tence: the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPSI6 and the Rus- 
sian GLONASS system7. The Russian constellation, for eco- 
nomic reasons, could not be replenished when consecutive satel- 
lites ended their operational life, therefore, the discussion on 
liability for global navigation satellite systems in the context of 
aviation has largely focused on GPS. In ICAO, for instance, 
many member states have expressed their hesitation to accept 
GPS as a structural component of air traffic services unless 
there would be some sort of international liability established 
for the provider(s) of system signals, specifically, the United 
States, preferably in the form of an international treaty.' 
With the advent of Galileo, the third global navigation sys- 
tem due to be operational by 2008 or shortly thereafterg, this 
discussion entered into a new phase, for two reasons. Firstly, 
the civil use of GPS in the context of safety-sensitive, highly- 
regulated and world-wide applications remains essentially con- 
fined to aviation. Other areas making substantive use of GPS 
are either not internationally and heavily regulated, such as 
maritime transport, or they concern non-professional areas such 
as private car-driving or yachting. By contrast, Galileo from the 
start was aimed at  providing services to a number of other 
GPS is a 24-satellite constellation fully operational a s  of 1994. The system, devel- 
oped for military purposes and operated under the aegis of the Department of Defense, 
in addition to a Precise Positioning Service (PPS) only available to the military, offers a 
Standard Positioning Service (SPS) available to civil users such a s  commercial aviation. 
U.S. President Clinton in 1996 offered such use for a period of a t  least ten years free of 
charge by means of The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy National 
Security Council, Fact Sheet U.S. Global Positioning System Policy, Mar. 29, 1996. 
' GLONASS was launched as a 24-Satellite system quite similar to GPS by the 
former Soviet Union, and became operational as of 1995. Equally developed by the mili- 
tary (space) forces, the GLONASS system is ultimately controlled by the Russian Minis- 
try of Defence, and emits both civil and military (encoded) signals. See Decree of the 
Government of the Russian Federation, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 237. See gener- 
ally, e.g., Patrick Salin, Regulatory Aspects of Future satellite Air Navigation Systems 
(FANS) on ICAO's 50th Birthday, 44 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR LUFT- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 174- 
175 (1995). 
See, e.g., Francis P. Schubert, An International Convention on GNSS Liability: 
When Does Desirable Become Necessary?, XXnT ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 245 
(1999); See also Milde, supra note 5, a t  132. 
' See e.g., Transport and  Telecommunications, 2420th Council Mtg, Doc. 7282102 
(Presse 78), 19-21 (Mar. 25-26, 2002); Council Regulation 876/2002/EC on setting up the 
Galileo Joint Undertaking, 2002 O.J. (L 13811). 
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transport applications such as high-speed trains or vessels as 
well as non-transport applications like time synchronisation, 
mobile phones, building, and banking. Secondly, in addition to 
free signals roughly similar to the free GPS Standard Position- 
ing Signals (SPS) signals, Galileo will provide a few categories 
of signals namely services against payment for which it also will 
have to accept a certain liability.'' 
11. THE CONCEPT OF LIABILITY IN A GLOBAL NAVIGATION 
SATELLITE SYSTEM CONTEXT 
When analysing liability for system signals andlor services 
that use those signals as crucial elements, on the one hand, 
global navigation systems do not and will not start operating in 
a legal or regulatory vacuum. On the other hand, most of exist- 
ing law and regulation is non-global navigation satellite system- 
specific. In many cases, the advent of global navigation satellite 
systems on the scene merely adds another potential ultimate 
cause of damage to those already in existence such as tradi- 
tional navigation errors, human errors, engine failure or force 
majeure, rather than leading to a fundamentally different, or 
separate legal paradigm." 
The legal environment within which GPS now and Galileo 
will soon operate actually comprises a wide range of separate 
and separately developed specific legal environments, none of 
which were developed principally with global navigation satel- 
lite systems in mind. Yet all of them potentially or actually im- 
pact upon global navigation satellite systems and its applica- 
tions. This includes liability. Most of these environments are 
nationally defined. That is, they operate only within the terri- 
tory of one particular state even if occasionally, as in air and 
space law, international regimes are superimposed. At the same 
ID Cf: already GALILEO Mission Requirements Document Issue 5, E.C./ESA, Rev. 
1.1 (Mar. 27, 2003); GALILEO Mission High Level Definition, E.C./ESA, Sept. 23, 2002; 
or extensively the "Recommendations and Conclusions" arising from Task I, Legal and 
Institutional Issues, of the GALILEI Study Cluster, DD-120, v. 2.1, July 24, 2003 [here- 
inaRer Recommendations and Conclusions]. See further infra section 6, focusing on this 
issue. 
" Cf: also Milde, supra note 5, at 134. 
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time, a global navigation satellite system is inherently global, 
and both GPS and Galileo address global markets. 
In view of such complexity, it is helpful to briefly consider 
the concept of liability which is a term used in numerous na- 
tional and international legal regimes.'* In each case, however, 
it may be differently interpreted and applied with the conse- 
quence that, a t  the international level, quite often a large 
measure of conhsion has arisen as to the scope, meaning and 
consequences in law of liability. Generally, "liability" is defined 
as a "condition of being responsible for a possible or actual loss, 
penalty, evil, expense or burden", and as "the state of being 
bound or obliged in law or justice to do, pay, or make good some- 
thing".13 In the context of Galileo, this definition has been elabo- 
rated as: "the accountability of a person or legal entity to com- 
pensate damage caused to another person or legal entity, in ac- 
cordance with specified legal principles and rules and based 
upon specified sources of law."14 Thus, liability depends upon a 
specific legal regime, which itself determines the boundaries of 
the particular liability regime at issue regarding where it ap- 
plies, which persons or legal entities are involved, what type of 
liability is provided for, and how compensation is being dealt 
with. 
From the perspective of seeing which liability regimes do or 
might apply to a GNSS and how they would apply, the funda- 
mental threefold distinction between contractual liability, non- 
- - - - - - - - - 
Cf: eg., the authors Liability and Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception or 
Misconstruction?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF 
OUTER SPACE 363-71 (1992). 
l3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 823 (5th ed. 1979); WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL 
DICTIONARY IN FIVE LANGUAGES: DEFINITIONS OF THE LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL TERMS 
AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN, ENGLISH AND CML LAW JURISDICTIONS Val. 11, p. 47 (1983), 
referring to, respectively, Union Oil Co. of California v. Basalt Rock Co., 30 Cal. App.2d 
317, 319 - 20 (1939), and Fidelity Coal Co. v. Diamond, 310 Ill. App. 387 (1941) [herein- 
after WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY]. 
" Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, a t  101. See also, Cooperation 
Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) - Galileo Between the 
European Community and its Member States and the People's Republic of China, art. 
2(i), Doc. Council of the EU 13324103 (Oct. 30, 2003) (defines liability as: "the legal ac- 
countability of a person or legal entity to compensate for damage caused to another 
person or legal entity in accordance with specific legal principles and rules. This obliga- 
tion may be prescribed in an  agreement (contractual liability) or in a legal norm (non- 
contractual liability)."). 
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contractual liability and product liability should also be noted. 
The key issue distinguishing the three types of liability focuses 
on the legal relationship between the claimant and the defen- 
dant. 
"Contractual liability," for purposes of this paper, is defined 
as "the liability which arises from a contract or agreement," and 
thus fundamentally deals with liability as between parties to a 
contract regarding activities undertaken in relation to damage 
suffered in the context of the contract and its subject matter.15 
Contractual liability is essentially a term coming from national 
law, and, by way of common denominator is explicit, formalised 
and already in existence at the time the relevant accident lead- 
ing to damage occurs. Hence, for the purpose of analysis here, it 
coincides in a principled sense with inter-party liability as it is 
often discussed on the public international level, where interna- 
tional treaties between states would essentially take the place of 
contracts. From a legal point of view, dealing with contractual 
liability is a matter of the freedom of parties to contract between 
themselves. This freedom may only be restricted by overriding 
public interests in contracts being generally fair, if indeed such 
public interests are expressed through law or other legally bind- 
ing documents. 
In view of the above definition of "contractual liability" non- 
contractual liability would then be liability for damage occur- 
ring outside a contractual relationship. This occurs where the 
person or entity suffering the damage is not formally or contrac- 
tually related to the person or entity causing it, and is likely 
unaware of the possibility of damage occurring nor is able to 
take precautionary measures against it.16 Thus, it equates at 
this level of abstraction with the tort liability17 of national legal 
l5 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 295, and WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL 
DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at Vol. I, p. 339, which define "contractual obligationn as 
"the obligation which arises from a contract or agreement." See also Recommendations 
and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 102. 
'' Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 102. 
l7 
"Tortn is defined as, "a private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of con- 
tract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damagesn. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1334; WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL 
DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at Vol. 11, p. 660. 
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systems, respectively the third-party liability known in interna- 
tional law. Its common denominator would thus be that the le- 
gal relationship is implicit, not formalised and solely based on 
the fact that one party is the proven cause of the damage sus- 
tained by the other party. 
As a consequence, protecting the interests of third parties 
through non-contractual liability regimes is a public matter, to 
be taken care of preferably by legislative means, since by defini- 
tion entities cannot protect their interests by contract or other- 
wise. Hence, this is also the type of liability which a public legis- 
lative document on the international level is most often con- 
cerned with, although exceptions exist, such as most notably the 
Warsaw system on contractual liability in international air 
transport." On the national level, this equates with the need 
for, preferably, a clear written law or statute, or in common law 
countries at least clear jurisprudence and customary law. 
"Product liability" is defined as, "the legal liability of manu- 
facturers and sellers to compensate buyers, users, and even by- 
standers, for damages or injuries suffered because of defects in 
goods purcha~ed".'~ Thus, as also dealt with in the context of 
G ~ l i l e o , ~ ~  it is of a different nature; not imposing liability upon 
someone for activities undertaken and damage suffered as a 
consequence, but imposing it upon someone having manufac- 
tured andlor sold a product by which, in the course of using it, 
damage has been caused. In a sense this constitutes an indirect 
form of liability, as the occurrence which triggers liability claims 
may take place long after the manufacturer or seller - the entity 
to be held liable - has had any involvement with the product. 
The relevant legal relationship here is effectively created 
through the product concerned. Also, product liability, even if 
elements may have found their way into contracts for the sale of 
the product in the last resort is a matter of general public inter- 
ests being preserved through the enunciation of explicit law. 
See further supra note 5, infra note 48, and accompanying text. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1089, and WEST'S LAW & 
COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at Vol. 11, p. 358. 
m See also Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 102. 
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111. GPS AND THE LEGATJFUNCTIONAL MODEL 
This section applies liability to the context of global naviga- 
tion systems, particularly GPS as it is the first fully operational 
version. 
To properly apply current liability concepts to GPS it is 
helpful to refer to the LegaVFunctional Model (Model) for a 
global navigation satellite system and its activities which was 
developed for the European Cornmi~sion.~~ It is based upon the 
fundamental categories of players and their ensuing legal rela- 
tionships. In view of the definition of liability provided above, 
this Model should help in answering the salient overarching - 
but rather broad - question on liability issues in the context of 
GPS. That is, which legal entities would be held liable to com- 
pensate for damage caused to another legal entity in the context 
of GPS activities? 
As a generic concept based upon the existence of the cur- 
rently operational systems, GPS and GLONASS, the Model pre- 
sumes three essential categories of satellite navigation func- 
tions are discernable. They are: 
1. basic or primary signal provision: which could hardly be 
labelled a "service provision" since existing basically of the 
provision only of signals-in-space carrying basic data; 
2. augmented or secondary signal pro~ision,'~ which some- 
times could be, and is, labelled "service provision", since 
more than just the signal-in-space carrying basic data is 
provided; and 
3. value-added service provision. 
This threefold categorisation of activities leads to a fourfold 
functional categorisation of key actors in the context of a global 
navigation satellite system with three fundamental categories of 
legal relationships involved. (Figure 1, Appendix Figure 1 
I' Id. 
22 See e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 250-1; Henaku, supra note 1, at 171. 
23 See e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 251-2; Henaku, supra note 1, at 172. 
Figure 1 is a reproduction inter alia of Figure 2, "The Functional Model of GNSS 
Signal and Service Provision", as contained in "Regulatory Issues* arising from Task I, 
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(Appendix 1) summarises the current situation with regard to 
GPS and GLONASS. GPS (and GLONASS) is a basic signal 
provider, with its SPS falling within the category of A. No bar- 
rier to access is in place, making it a clear open access-type sig- 
nal available to three categories of players: the end-users, the 
value-added service providers and the augmentation providers. 
This, essentially at  their own initiative: anyone with the right 
type of receiver can receive the signal without any service fee 
being required. (The GPS precise positional services (PPS) are 
not included in this Model, since they are encoded and made 
available only to a very limited group of users - basically the 
U.S. military and NATO allies.) 
The major issue in particular for aviation in view of rele- 
vant ICAO requirements is that the SPS, in addition to the ab- 
sence of high-level accuracy and continuity, lacks the level of 
integrity monitoring25 necessary for serving as a stand-alone 
system for approach, landing and take-off operations of aircraft. 
As .to the augmentation providers, A is currently being 
picked up by three such satellite-based wide-area augmentation 
systems in experimental fashion: the European Geostationary 
Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS)26 for Europe, the Wide 
Area Augmentation System (WAAS)27 for the United States, and 
the Multi-Functional Transport Satellite-Based Augmentation 
System (MSAS)" for Japan and the surrounding region." These 
Legal and Institutional Zssws, of the GALILEI Study Cluster, DD-123, v. 1.1, 16 July 
2002, 24. Whilst this document is only publicly available in v. 2.0, of 5 December 2002, 
where i t  has not been included, this Figure lies a t  the root of all relevant Figures also of 
Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, a t  102. 
25 
"Integrity" refers to the trust a user can place in the correctness of the signals, 
and to his being warned if the signals are no longer within the bounds of such correct- 
ness as indicated by certain parameters. 
28 EGNOS stands for European Geo-stationary Navigation Overlay System, and is 
currently developed by the European Tripartite Group consisting of European Union as 
represented by the European Commission, the European Space Agency (ESA) and Euro- 
control, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. See e.g., Henaku, 
supra note 1, a t  175-6. 
* WAAS stands for Wide Area Augmentation System, and is currently developed by 
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See e.g., Henaku, supra note 1, a t  174- 
5. 
" MSAS stands for Multi-functional transport Satellite-based Augmentation Sys- 
tem, and is currently developed by the Japanese government. See e.g., Henaku, supra 
note 1 a t  176. 
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systems make up for the lack of accuracy and integrity inherent 
in A that precludes any safety-sensitive usage, by augmenting A 
into becoming B: signals which do comply with the high levels 
required for aviation in most or even all phases of flight.30 
In cases of safety-sensitive usage, value-added service pro- 
viders would likely be forced by the governmental authorities 
under national or even international regulation to use B (in- 
stead of A); outside such situations, the use of B may be equally 
at  the value-added service provider's, alternatively end-user's 
own initiative. Of course, aviation would be the clearest exam- 
ple of regulation-induced or -required usage of B. 
Whilst indeed the augmentation providers mentioned in 
terms of operational requirements are very much focusing on 
aviation, as the most directly interested transport sector, al- 
ready at  present this does not preclude other users - such as for 
purposes of precision farming - from using EGNOS or WAAS 
signals. Certainly in principle, nothing prevents augmented 
signals, even if developed purely for aviation requirements from 
being of interest to other sectors, a t  least until access would be- 
come closed or controlled. 
Finally, value-added service providers may use either A or 
B, depending upon their need and the costs involved, to incorpo- 
rate them into value-added services C, such as navigation in- 
formation, in general, perhaps on a commercial basis but cer- 
tainly in the case of aviation essentially on a regulatory basis. 
Currently, to the extent that authorities are considering allow- 
ing or even requiring users to use system signals, that is, 
mainly within aviation, these will be incorporated into C as Air 
Traffic Services (ATS) and Air Traffic Control (ATC) services, in 
addition to being directly received and used by aircraft opera- 
tors. In view of the large measure of orientation on aviation in 
current global navigation satellite system augmentation, a t  pre- 
29 There are a few non satellite based augmentation systems that will not be dis- 
cussed. However, examples include LORAN-C (Long-Range Navigation system) and D- 
GPS (Differential GPS). 
" As discussed in particular in the context of ICAO, the ultimate ideal would be for 
GNSS to constitute "sole meansn of navigation for all phases of flights, since it is then 
that in terms of necessary infrastructure and avionics the economic advantages of hav- 
ing a single global coherent and interoperable system become fully available. 
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sent, the aviation sector is the only sector where such value- 
added service providers already play an important role. Else- 
where, comprehensive, general and widespread provision of C is 
hardly at  issue so far. It is for that reason also that air law en- 
ters into the equation, including the air law liability regimes. 
Because of the current focus of global navigation satellite sys- 
tems on aviation, the effect of air law liability has a major im- 
pact "upstream" on the signal and service provision by both ba- 
sic signal and augmentation providers. At the same time, this 
changes to the extent that system signals and services, either 
now or in the future, would be used in other sectors - in princi- 
ple, however, in accordance with the same generic Model for 
global navigation satellite systems. 
IV. GPS AND LIABILITY 
The GNSS LegaWunctional Model (Figure 1, Appendix 1) 
already indicates the major issues for GPS as far as liability is 
concerned The arrows marked A, B and C, whilst representing 
categories of signals and services, now translate into the rele- 
vant legal relationships in terms of liability. In the case of A, 
such liability is unlikely to be qualified as contractual liability 
as previously defined since open access to those signals and the 
impossibility for the provider to monitor who receives and uses 
it would negate the existence of a contract. The term "contract" 
is used here in the widest possible sense: a bilateral agreement, 
in principle in writing, freely concluded between two parties 
containing mutual rights and  obligation^.^^ Thus, an agreement 
between two states or one state and a foreign private entity 
would also qualify as a "contract" under this definition, even if 
the public nature of one of the parties might cause important 
additional legal problems to arise. In spite of some arguments 
31 
"Contract" is defined as, "an agreement between two or more persons which cre- 
ates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing", of which the "essentials are 
competent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and 
mutuality of obligation". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 291-92, and 
W ~ s r s  LAW & COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at Vol. I, p. 338. Whereas, 
"contract" can also refer to "the writing which contains the agreement of parties, with 
the terms and conditions, and which serves as a proof of the obligation". Id. 
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that try to establish a "virtual" contract between the primary 
signal provider and all others,32 most experts agree that the pro- 
vision of these signals would not give rise to contractual liabil- 
 it^.^^ 
In the case of GPS, U.S. authorities have disclaimed the ex- 
istence of anything similar to a "contract" or bilateral or multi- 
lateral international agreement, against efforts to construe a 
contractual relationship and hence any contractual-type of li- 
ability.34 However, they do not deny in principle the possibility 
for liability claims under U.S. tort law. 
In the case of B and C, there can be far less doubt that the 
provision of such signals and services even in the current case of 
GPS, would be a matter of contract. The successful efforts to 
involve the respective aviation authorities in developing WAAS 
and EGNOS would amount to a contract even if proper, formal 
contracts would not be signed. 
At the same time, in terms of liability one should realise 
that, as concluded before,35 contractual liability principally 
should be seen to refer to liability in case of damage caused by 
the one party to the contract to the other. All then depends upon 
the definition of "damage" in the legal liability regime applied to 
it. Does it include indirect damage? If not, contractual liability 
could only refer to the damage caused to the contract partner's 
receiver, not to the damage, such as an aircraft crashing, result- 
ing from incorrect information delivered to the receiver, or from 
information not sent to the receiver. 
If the focus is on the aviation sector as the major target for 
augmentation by EGNOS, WAAS and MSAS, the issue of con- 
tractual liability in view of the existing air law liability regimes 
is raised and a fourth relevant category of legal relationships, 
clearly "contractual" in nature, also arises. In Figure 1 (Appen- 
dix I), the end-users effectively represent the aircraft operators. 
The consumers, the passengers or consignors of cargo, arise as a 
separate category of "actors". They find themselves in a contrac- 
32 See e.g., Henaku, supra note 1, at 183-85. 
" See Milde, supra note 5, at 134-35. 
" Id. at 133-35. 
35 See supra, Section 2 ,  on the definition of contractual liability. 
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tual relationship with the airlines, a relationship represented by 
an arrow D in Figure 2 (Appendix 2). This is an important as- 
pect which in turn relates to liability as will be seen. 
For non-contractual liability, as previously defined in terms 
of the structure surnmarised by Figure 1 (Appendix I), this re- 
sults in the following picture. The essence of non-contractual, 
third-party liability, it may be reasserted, would be that outsid- 
ers to a specific activity suffer damage as a consequence of an 
activity. For such reasons, regardless of the existence of GNSS, 
relevant non-contractual tort and third-party liability regimes 
not specifically focused on GNSS would nevertheless apply. 
In terms of "actors" in the area of GNSS, as the building 
blocks for the Legal/Functional Model of Figure 1 (Appendix I), 
such "outsiders" could therefore be easily lumped together in 
one category, as third-party victims. All possible non- 
contractual liability relationships of such third-party victims 
with all of the true "actors" of Figure 1 (Appendix I), including 
the consumers added above, can then be represented by various 
arrows E. 
It depends on any applicable third-party liability regime, 
national or international, whether such third parties suffering 
damage could assert a claim not only to the entity or person 
causing the damage directly, for example, the aircraft operator, 
but also to the system signal provider having delivered wrongful 
navigation information to that entity ultimately at the root of 
the accident. 
In the case of GPS, U.S. national third-party liability, that 
is, to r t  law would be considered. Here, the concept of sovereign 
immunity is key to successfully assert a claim for non- 
contractual liability. Absent specific provisions to the contrary, 
this concept means that any claim for public liability against the 
U.S. government would be inadmissible. The rule would be that 
the U.S. government may not be sued for public liability.36 
36 
"Sovereign immunity" is defined as "preclud[ing] litigant from asserting an oth- 
erwise meritorious cause of action against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attrib- 
utes unless sovereign consents to suit". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 
1252, and WEST'S LAW & COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at Vol. 11, p. 552, 
referring to Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, 
333 F. Supp. 353, 355 (1971). 
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By way of exceptions to the rule, precise regulations then 
exist which provide for circumstances where the sovereign im- 
munity of the U.S. government is or might be waived.  he rele- 
vant U.S. regulations for the present would be the Fed- 
eral Tort Claims the Suits in Admiralty the Foreign 
Claims Act3' and the Military Claims Act." Generally speaking, 
it is rather uncertain that either of these acts could be used for 
the successful assertion of claims regarding GPS failures and 
consequent damages. As a result, claims for U.S. public liability 
for GPS might easily fail.41 For example, the Federal Tort 
Claims Act does not apply in case of "any claim arising in a for- 
eign Or, the Suits in Admiralty Act applies only if 
"the accident (1) arose on the high seas or navigable waters of 
the United States; (2) posed a potential threat to maritime 
commerce; and (3) was substantially related to traditional mari- 
time a~tivity."~ 
Moreover, in view of the global application of GPS, the 
problem of non-U.S. citizens claiming for compensation in U.S. 
courts would remain. From a practical and political point of 
view, such claims would require the claimant to travel to the 
United States, introduce his claim in English to U.S. courts, 
possibly hire a U.S. lawyer, and suchlike. There would be no 
fundamental legal impediment for non-U.S. citizens to do so, but 
in practice it might turn out to be rather difficult to assert one's 
- 
claims. Furthermore, a claim before a U.S. court against the 
- 
U.S. government for damage resulting from the usage of signals 
provided for free is not a very promising venue in terms of pos- 
sible success. 
It is doubtable, finally, whether other governments which 
would ultimately be held responsible for the safety of aviation in 
37 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC 58 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988). 
38 Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 USC Appx. $8 741-752 (1988). 
39 Foreign Claims Act, 10 USC 8 2734 (1994). 
40 Military Claims Act, 10 USC 8 2733 (1994). 
4 1  See Jonathan M. Epstein, Global Positioning System (GPS): Defining the Legal 
Issues of its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J .  AIR L. & COM. 243,262-68 (1995). 
"' Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 37, 82680(k). See also Epstein, supra note 42, 
265. 
43 Under the so-called "Sisson testn, Sisson v. Ruby 497 U.S. 358 (1990), as dealt 
with by Epstein, supra note 42, 266. 
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their own airspace44 would agree to sue in a private capacity 
within the U.S. legal system. This was the main reason states in 
ICAO proposed that a relevant treaty on GNSS liability should 
be drafted." Additionally, if the damage occurs in a jurisdiction 
other than that of the United States, i t  might be possible to as- 
sert a claim against the GPS providers in those jurisdictions. In 
practice however, the option for the United States not to waive 
its sovereign immunity would make any such possibility a theo- 
retical one. 
Finally, as to product liability, the manufacturers and sell- 
ers could be brought into Figure 1 (Appendix 1) as another cate- 
gory of relevant actors within the GNSS Model. The potential 
liability relationships are represented by arrows F in Figure 2 
(Appendix 2). This is the result of applying the relevant catego- 
ries of liability onto the Figure 1 (Appendix 1) Model. These re- 
lationships are with all the actors referred to before, including 
the third-party victims even though in practice this would likely 
be dealt with by law which is not GNSS-specific (see in particu- 
lar arrow F-6). Since the manufacture or sale of relevant prod- 
ucts is not the business of the GPS operators, further analyses 
are beyond the scope of this paper. In sum, as to the issue of 
liability for the first generation global navigation systems, Fig- 
ure 2 (Appendix 2) represents the situation as applicable to GPS 
as a basic signal provider and for its augmentation provider.46 
Using the aviation sector as an example for illustrating the 
relevant liability issues, it is noted that the value-added service 
providers would be mainly ATS and ATC providers, the end- 
user would consist of the airlines and the consumers would be 
the passengers and consignors of cargo. 
" See Convention On International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 28, 61 Stat. 
1180, 15 UNTS 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. See also Schubert, supra note 8, 
at 252-54. 
'' See e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 258-61. 
" Figure 2 is a reproduction of Figure 4 located in, The GNSS-1 Functional Model 
and Liability Issues (GPS, GLONASS), [2002] WP I.4.B, GALILEO System Liability - 
Part I - Interoperability, v.2, of the GALILEI Study Cluster. Whilst this document is not 
publicly available, this Figure is an adaptation of Figure 1 to the liability scenario, and 
as such underlying also Figure 5, infia. 
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Since A does not encompass contractual liability, both for- 
eign ATC-providers and foreign airlines could only claim for 
anything other than contractual liability for GPS-related darn- 
ages. This leads to the crucial question of how compensable 
damage is to be defined: events likely to cause damage of a 
really major dimension as a consequence of erroneous or absent 
navigation information by GNSS do not concern the direct dam- 
age caused by emission of the signals as such, but, for example, 
the crash of an aircraft. The conclusion should be that such lat- 
, . 
ter cases of liability would normally be dealt with by either con- 
tractual liability as far as the passengers or consignors of cargo 
are concerned, or third-party liability relative to  innocent vic- 
tims on the ground. In air law, the first refers to the 1929 War- 
saw Convention" and subsequent contractual liability conven- 
tions up to the 1999 Montreal Convention4' - which are sub- 
sumed under D. The second refers to the 1952 Rome Convention 
on third-party liability,49 or for the many states where this Con- 
vention is not in force, national tort law, which is subsumed un- 
der E-4. 
47 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5. 
4a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 
May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc. 9740 (entered into force Nov. 4 2003) [hereinafter Montreal 
Convention]. The other international instruments to be referred to encompass such 
agreements as the Hague Protocol, supra note 5; the Convention, Supplementary to the 
Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car- 
riage by Air Performed by a Person other than the Contracting Camer,  Sept. 18, 1961, 
500 U.N.T.S. 31, ICAO Doc. 8181 (entered into force May 1, 1964) [hereinafter Guadala- 
jara Convention]; the Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Con- 
vention and the Hague Protocol, May 4, 1966, Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 
18,900, approved by Exec. Order No. 23,680,31 Fed. Reg. 7302; Additional Protocol No. 1 
to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Camage by Air, Signed a t  Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Sept. 25, 1975, U.K.T.S. 1997 
No. 75, ICAO Doc. 9145 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1996); Additional Protocol No. 2 to 
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, Signed a t  Warsaw on 12 October 1929 a s  Amended by the Protocol done 
a t  The Hague on 28 September 1955, September 25, 1975, U.KT.S. 1997 No. 76, ICAO 
Doc. 9146 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1996); and Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the 
 convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air, Signed a t  Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol done a t  The 
Hague on 28 September 1955, September 25, 1975, U.K.T.S. 1999 No. 28, ICAO Doc. 
9148 (entered into force June 1 4  1998). 
- 
'' conventionem Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Sur- 
face, October 7, -1952,310 U.N.T.S. 181;ICAO Doc. 7364 (entered into force Feb. 4 1958) 
[hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
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It follows that both these regimes would apply in principle 
regardless of whether navigation errors were the cause of the 
accident, or more "traditional" events - human errors, thunder- 
storms, engine failures or sabotage, if not specifically falling 
under clauses excepting terrorism-related accidents. Both of 
them point to the airlines as the liable entities. So the first 
question under non-contractual liability is to what extent claim- 
ants might want to circumvent these regimes, and then, as 
third-party claimants from the perspective of navigation service 
providers, claim directly against the basic signal or augmenta- 
tion providers. The extent to which the applicable third-party 
liability regimes, in this case the U.S. tort system, would allow 
them to do so is then the next, more important question. Other 
states do not feel comfortable with this option, hence their de- 
sire to solidify possibilities for claims by an international con- 
vention on GNSS liability for the aviation sector. However, the 
United States is not particularly interested in such an option, 
which may likely cause this approach to be impractical for the 
time being.50 As a consequence, Eurocontrol has developed the 
concept of the contractual liability chain. Contracts are to spell 
out the extent of liability accepted between the parties, includ- 
ing to what extent derogation to the other party of "ulterior" 
liabilities under the contract might be ~a r r an t ed .~ '  
V. GALILEO AND THE LEGALD'UNCTIONAL MODEL 
The complexity of Galileo as compared to the current situa- 
tion becomes apparent upon adapting the Model for GPS, that is 
for generic systems of the first generation to  the case of Galileo, 
which is effectively a second-generation system. Firstly, GPS is 
operated and controlled by a single-state entity, the U.S. De- 
partment of Defense, even if civil users are involved through 
consultation boards and other mechanisms, whereas Galileo is 
envisaged to be operated by a private operator, provisionally 
See Schubert, supra note 8, at 261; Milde, supra note 5, at 132 . 
61 See e.g., Setting up the Contractual Framework, Eurocontrol GNSS LTF, 
C/SF/p010506/17.05.01; Skyguide memo to Eurocontrol GNSS LTF of 5 March 2003; 
Refocusing the work of the EUROCONTROL GNSS Legal Task Force, Skyguide Memo, 
C/SF/October 6,2003. See also Schubert, supra note 8, at 261. 
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called the Galileo Operating Company (C~mpany) .~~  It is to be 
supervised by a public entity provisionally called the Galileo 
Supervisory Authority (Authority) representing the European 
Union, the European Space Agency (ESA) and their member 
states.53 Together they comprise the Galileo Core Structure. 
The main reasons for involving a private operator as a key 
entity in the organisational structure for a system with obvious 
fundamental public aspects were? 
flexible, non-bureaucratic and commercial modes of opera- 
tion; 
marketing purposes; 
obtaining finances and investments from the capital mar- 
kets in normal commercial modes; 
dealing with intellectual property rights in a proper and 
more commercially-oriented fashion; 
obtaining insurance against limited liability;55 
making a sensible business partner; and 
the far better capabilities of, and opportunities available to, 
a private entity to develop new services and markets in a 
commercially assertive manner. 
Conversely, the reasons for involving a public oversight 
body as a key entity in the organisational structure for a system 
where private and commercial modes of operation have been 
deemed to be most beneficial were? 
52 It may be noted that the process of tendering the concession began October 2003, 
the aim being that by the end of 2004 a winning concessionaire will be selected to fulfil 
that role of the "Galileo Operating Company". 
* See also the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of structures 
for the management of the European satellite radionavigation programme, COM(03)471 
final at 4 & art. 19 hereinafter Management Structures Proposal]. 
54 See e.g., Recommendations-and Conclusions, supra note 10, at  33. 
53 It may be noted that insurance against unlimited liability is either outright im- 
possible to obtain, or likely to be impossibly expensive. See also infra note 59. 
56 See e.g., Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 33-34. 
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negotiating and concluding agreements with states "exter- 
nal" to Galileo yet hosting Galileo-related assets and service 
providers;67 
licensing non-European augmentation and integrity provid- 
ers, or negotiating and concluding agreements on such op- 
erations by the private operator; 
serving the general public interests, for example in regard 
of safety, security and search-and-rescue issues;58 
possibly offering unlimited liability in the last resort to 
value-added service providers and end-users;59 
enhancing the trust by the public at  large in the system 
with respect to such issues as certification and safety li- 
censes; 
67 The Management Structures Proposal provides that, 
'The Supervisory Authority shall be open to the participation of countries 
which are not members of the European Union and which have concluded 
agreements with the European Union to this effect. Under the relevant provi- 
sions of these agreements, arrangements shall be worked out specifymg, in 
particular, the nature, scope and procedural aspects of the involvement of 
these countries in the work of the Supervisory Authority, including provisions 
relating to financial contributions and staff." 
Management Structures Proposal, supra note 53, a t  art. 19. 
Id. art. 1 (the Galileo Supervisory Authority should "manage the public interests 
relating to the European satellite radionavigation programme"), also id. arts. 20-22 
(setting up a Centre for Security and Safety). 
59 In order to enhance the attractiveness of Galileo to the maximum, offering accep- 
tance of unlimited liability (where appropriate) would be necessary; this however would 
somehow have to rest upon the shoulders of the public entities concerned, namely the 
GSA and the member states behind it. See also supra note 56. Clearly, this has not been 
decided yet. Article 17 of the Management Structures Proposal only mentions: 
"1. Contractual liability on the part of the Supervisory Authority shall be gov- 
erned by the law applicable to the contract in question.. ." 
2. In the event of non-contractual liability, the Supervisory Authority shall 
take steps, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of 
the Member states, to remedy any damage caused by its departments or by its 
staff in the performance of their duties ..." 
Management Structures Proposal, supra note 53, a t  art. 17. 
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for purposes of negotiating where necessary access for the 
private operator to the markets of states not belonging to 
the Galileo core group of states; and 
liaising with other relevant organisations such as ICAO. 
Secondly, Galileo aims to provide at least five different sets 
of services as opposed to GPS which, apart from an open SPS 
signal, only emits a closed access PPS signal. Technically speak- 
ing, a number of various signals-in-space will be emitted by the 
Galileo satellites which, through being combined in various 
ways and further differentiated by means of additional charac- 
teristics, result in the four main Galileo services being delivered 
to value-added service providers and end-users. They are the 
open service, the commercial services, the safety-of-life services 
and the public-regulated ser~ices.~' In addition, a contribution to 
existing search-and-rescue services (SAR) as currently provided 
by the COSPAS-SARSAT system is intended.61 
The open service will be provided for free and will be simi- 
lar to the GPS SPS, albeit perhaps slightly enhanced in respect 
of accuracy and continuity. Most importantly therefore, from a 
legal and regulatory perspective the characteristics of this ser- 
vice would again lead to the principled absence of a contractual 
situation between the Company and the value-added service 
provider or end-user. Hence, it is referred to as A for the pur- 
pose of the Model. 
The open service would be provided directly by the Galileo 
system to both value-added services providers and end-users. 
This is where a number of individualised mass-market applica- 
tions are envisaged to arise. Any user with a technically com- 
patible receiver will be able to receive and use the signal for his 
or her own purposes, and he or she would require no more than 
such a receiver to benefit from the signals. 
From a legal and regulatory perspective, the commercial 
services, the safety-of-life services and the public regulated ser- 
vices, can be taken together as B in the Model because of the 
See GALILEO Mission Requirements Document, supra note 10, at 19-22. 
Id. a t  24. 
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presence of a contract in some form with the Company. What- 
ever characteristics would then be added per service, or per type 
of contract, some form of contractual relationship will arise. 
This allows for considerable opportunities for the Company to 
determine the legal relationship with value-added service pro- 
viders and end-users, including liability. 
Perhaps the signals involved still would call for a user to 
have a compatible receiver, were it not devices would be used to 
control access to them. In the latter case however, which is the 
current scenario, both a compatible receiver and the encryption 
or authentication key would be necessary before the signals can 
be used in an authenticated fashion. Consequently a contract for 
subscription, or other legal instrument setting forth rights and 
obligations of the two parties between each other, will be re- 
quired. These aspects would apply to all three variants of B. 
There are, of course, elements which separate those vari- 
ants. The commercial services would specifically focus on pro- 
viding higher accuracy by added data, higher continuity and 
higher availability with the support from local elements where 
required. A proper service guarantee would come to spell out the 
obligation of the Company to provide services up to certain 
standards of accuracy, continuity and availability. These ser- 
vices would be renumerated directly through a user fee, by any 
value-added service provider, or other user, interested in the 
higher accuracy, continuity and availability as well as the ser- 
vice guarantee likely to be provided. Applications would arise in 
such higher-end mass-market areas as location-based services, 
integrated telecom-and-information services and those traffic 
control systems which are commercially- but not safety- or secu- 
rity-sensitive, like road tolling. 
The safety-of-life services first focused on aviation. With the 
potential to be extended to other safety-sensitive transportation, 
high-speed vessels, high-speed trains, for example, these ser- 
vices will have as their outstanding feature integrity monitoring 
up to the level required by aviation for taxiing, take-off and 
landing addressed by the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, 
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containing the relevant SARPS.~' Where the world-wide integ- 
rity to be provided by the Company is not acceptable or not ac- 
cepted, such integrity monitoring may also be provided by re- 
gional elements outside of the Galileo Core System (GCS). In 
this respect the legal situation will be correspondingly compli- 
cated because of an additional, non-Galileo and presumably 
non-European entity being involved next to the Company. Fur- 
thermore, local elements might be involved in locally providing 
the necessary higher performance in terms of accuracy, avail- 
ability and continuity. Payment would be through the general 
user fees for navigation services of which Galileo would only 
form one element. The payment would be paid by the users to 
the value-added service providers which in turn would pay the 
Company for the Galileo-input it provided.63 
Currently, safety and security-sensitive sectors such as 
aviation, and maritime transport, are involved in the usage of 
such services, whether GNSS-based or not. They would provide 
the relevant markets for these types of Galileo signals. 
The public-regulated services will aim at  governmental and 
other public services such as police, fire-brigades, emergency, 
perhaps crucial infrastructures for energy, water and communi- 
cations. Their outstanding feature will be a high level of techni- 
cal security against interference, jamming, spoofing and unau- 
thorised usage. This will be guaranteed through technical ro- 
bustness and encryption. Payment for those services would 
likely occur through availability payments or other lump-sum 
arrangements, by the relevant governmental department or 
service. The SAR service falls outside of the construct of the 
Model. Essentially the signal provider, the Galileo core entities, 
will pay for signal provision, to be refunded through the partici- 
pating states. 
In principle, the Galileo Model could be developed for each 
of the four core services, in order to achieve a precise overview 
of the relevant issues. This, however, would obviously go beyond 
the scope of the current article, and it suffices here to "stack" 
62 See supra note 2. 
63 See Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 122,175. 
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the four Models which would otherwise arise onto each other so 
as to form one "generic* Galileo Model. 
Further, these four types of core services will, generally 
speaking, be offered to non-Galileo entities, which are for the 
overwhelming part essentially interested in offering or consum- 
ing a service of which the relevant Galileo service forms only 
one element. From a wider perspective therefore, the area of 
Galileo-relevant services is currently envisaged to encompass 
basically three categories of services: 
Galileo-only services (open service, commercial services, 
safety-of-life services, public-regulated services), to be pro- 
vided by the GCS, that is, in terms of architecture the satel- 
lites in space and the necessary ground infrastructure, al- 
ternatively by the GCS in conjunction with regional ele- 
ments providing regional integrity. 
Galileo local services for example, airport approach sys- 
tems, to be provided by local elements in combination with 
the GCS, plus - optionally - regional elements. 
Galileo combined services such as mapping and database, 
or telecom services, to be provided by other systems, 
whether global, regional or local, together with any combi- 
nation of the GCS, regional elements and local elements. 
This last category is where C comes in: a theoretically wide 
range of value-added services incorporating Galileo timing, posi- 
tioning and navigation inf~rmat ion .~~ Provision of value-added 
services by the Company itself currently is not foreseen. All the 
above considerations led to the Model for Galileo as represented 
by Figure 3 (Appendix 3).65 
A word of caution is due here, however. With the process of 
tendering and finally negotiating for the Galileo concession to be 
awarded by the end of 2004 just having gotten under way, this 
a In the context of the Galileo Architecture Definition (GALA) Study performed for 
the European Commission, 100 different applications were discerned as presenting 
potentially interesting markets for Galileo services; see in particular GALA, Synthesis 
on Service Definition, Gala-ASPI-TNO11, a t  39-44, (Oct. 10 2001). 
65 Figure 3 is a slightly adapted reproduction of Figure 2 of Recommendations and 
Conclusions. See Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, a t  79. 
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Model is reflecting the current presumptions on what the Gali- 
Leo structure will look like by 2008, the year of envisaged full 
operational capability of the Galileo system. In the end, that 
structure may turn out to look different in some areas. These 
could include the precise outline of the relevant services, the 
role the Company is going to play in that respect, as well as the 
respective roles, rights and obligations of the Company and the 
Authority between them. At the same time, this largely con- 
cerns the internal division of tasks, competencies, responsibili- 
ties and liabilities within the GCS. It would not fundamentally 
change the equation as far as the legal role of the GCS relative 
to other actors is concerned. 
VI. GALILEO AND LIABILITY 
Similarly to the generic GNSS Model as applied to GPS, the 
liability issues can be charted upon the specific case of Galileo 
(Figure 4, Appendix 4). Again, the arrows in Figure 3 (Appen- 
dix 3) that represent the respective general legal relationships 
following from the provision of certain signals or services are 
now translated effectively into liability-relationships; the direc- 
tion of the arrows pointing to which entity liability might be 
owed by the entity at the sending end of the arrow. 
The regional elements as well as local elements have been 
left out. As to the regional elements, special contracts namely, 
in the form of international agreements of a specific nature 
might be entertained, in which case liability issues might be 
included in the contracts. If no such contracts would be envis- 
aged, as the GCS would tend to view the role of such regional 
elements as autonomous, almost as the GPS authorities look 
upon EGNOS and MSAS, the liability which might apply here 
would be of a non-contractual nature. 
A similar situation would pertain to local elements enhanc- 
ing the Galileo signals and services without providing value- 
added services. Unlike the regional elements, local elements 
might have to be contracted by the Company if the Company 
sees a need for their involvement. In a sense, the liability issues 
here might work the other way around: when paying for local 
enhancement to better sell its services, the Company might look 
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for protection against liability for damage as a result of the local 
element-input, rather than being required to offer protection to 
such local elements in terms of liability. This might also be de- 
termined to a considerable extent by contractual negotiations on 
many levels and among many entities. 
Galileo SAR services were not included in Figure 3 (Appen- 
dix 3) and are not in Figure 4 (Appendix 4). Thus, the chart in 
Figure 4 (Appendix 4) emerges.66 
Figure 4 (Appendix 4) represents a generic liability chart 
for Galileo. Just as the U.S. authorities would likely deny any 
liability other than of a non-contractual nature for the GPS 
SPS, Galileo would not accept any contractual liability for the 
open service A, since A is not contracted for. Similarly to GPS, 
Galileo would also refuse to accept such contractual liability in 
jurisdictions other than those of the European states constitut- 
ing the A ~ t h o r i t ~ , ~ '  even if the Company may not be able to in- 
voke sovereign immunity in those cases, so that it ultimately 
depends upon non-Galileo jurisdictions whether liability, alter- 
natively a refusal thereof, might nevertheless be acknowledged. 
Regarding Figure 4 (Appendix 4), it is important to realise 
that the major liability issues regarding Galileo arise outside 
the core categories of actors involved in the contractual relation- 
ships and therefore are outside the Galileo legal framework. In 
the context of activities covered by the contractual relationships 
under A, B and even C, the possibilities for causing damage di- 
rectly, in and of itself, by such activities are likely to result in 
damage of a rather limited nature. It is under D, that the darn- 
ages start to be major, leading to key contractual liability is- 
sues. 
" Figure 4 is a slightly adapted reproduction of Figure 17 of Recommendations and 
Conclusions. See Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, a t  105. 
67 I t  should be noted that recently, the People's Fkpublic of China and the European 
Commission, acting on behalf of the Galileo Joint Undertaking and hence indirectly also 
on behalf of ESA, have come to a mutual understanding that the former would invest an  
amount in the range of 200 million € in Galileo. The details of this understanding, for 
example a s  to what the investment will exactly comprise and to what extent the People's 
Republic of China would become "integrated* in the institutional structure still have to 
be negotiated, but may for example result in a sort of associated membership of the 
GSA. 
154 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW [VOL. 30 
The classical example would be that of an aircraft causing 
damage to its passengers in the course of the flight for which 
those passengers contracted, whether ultimately caused by 
wrong or absent GNSS-derived input, whether A, B or C, or by 
more traditional human or technical failures. These damages 
form the subject-matter of a well-elaborated regime of air law.68 
In case of system signals used in other transport sectors, 
relevant sector-specific regimes would apply in similar fashion. 
Thus, for maritime transport, available treaties include the 
Athens Convention of 197469; for rail transport, the Convention 
concerning the International Transport by Rail,'' together with the 
Convention concerning the Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by 
Rail," and the Convention concerning the Carriage of Goods by 
RailI2 and its 1990 Protoc01'~ on cargo; and for road transport, the 
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Pas- 
sengers and Luggage by RoadI4 on passenger Liability. " 
Major or catastrophic damage could also arise under certain 
categories of the non-contractual liabilities E, along the lines of 
the above, especially E-4, mirroring D. It is unlikely that the 
BB See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, and supra note 48. 
@ Athens Convention Relating to the carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by 
Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, U.K.T.S. 1987 No. 40, 14 I.L.M. 945, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT 
TREATIES, 1-229 (Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force Apr. 28, 1987). 
Convention concerning the International Transport by Rail, May 9, 1980, 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT REATIES, V-183 (Supp. 1-10 1986), entered into force May 
1,1985 hereinafter COTIF Convention]. 
" Convention concerning the Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Rail, Feb. 7, 
1970, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT TREATIES, V-133 (Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1975, effectively incorporated and superseded by the COTIF Convention of May 
1,1985, supra note 70). 
72 Convention concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail, Feb. 7, 1970, 
INTERNATIONAL TR NSPORT REATIES, V-58 (Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1975, effectively incorporated and superseded by the COTIF Convention of May 1,1985, 
supra note 70). 
l3 Protocol of 1990 to Amend the International Convention concerning the Interna- 
tional Transport by Rail (COTIF) of 9 May 1980, Dec. 20, 1990, INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSPORT TREATIES, V-300 (Supp. 15 1991) (entry into force Nov. 1, 1996). 
" Convention on the Contract for the International Camage of Passengers and 
Luggage by Road (CVR), Mar. 1, 1973, INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT REATIES, IV-43 
(Supp. 1-10 1986) (entered into force Apr. 12, 1994). 
l5 See Frans G. von der Dunk, The European Equation: GNSS = Multimodality + 
Liability, in AIR AND SPACE LAW IN THE 21" CENTURY 240-245 (Marietta Benko & Walter 
K.011 eds., 2001) hereinafter The European Equation]. 
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provision of open service A, commercial serviceslsafety-of-life 
services/public-regulated services B, or value-added services C, 
or even of final services to consumers D, in itself causes any sig- 
nificant harm to third-party victims. More likely, major damage 
would be the result of end-users using those signals or services 
and in doing so causing non-contractual damage leading to non- 
contractual liability. 
The example here is an aircraft crash causing damage to 
third party victims on the ground. Here also air law provides 
the applicable rules: to the extent applicable, the 1952 Rome 
Convention, and where not, national tort namely, third-party 
liability regimes.76 In case of system signals used in other trans- 
port sectors, there are as of yet no international regimes dealing 
with third-party liability.77 So, in conclusion, mutatis mutandis 
national regimes likely of a general nature would apply. 
In terms of product liabilities subsumed under F, liability 
may be different in each instance of F represented. It will de- 
pend upon the product at issue, the potential uses to which the 
actors in Figure 4 (Appendix 4) put those products, and the par- 
ticular risks they entail of being harmed themselves by doing so. 
They may only incidentally serve to deal with system-induced 
damage. In any case, the conclusion should be that such liabili- 
ties are, so far, not dealt with by GNSS-specific product liability 
law, but rather, if at all, by general product liability law nor- 
mally of a national character. Only in the context of EC law has 
distinct product liability law been developed at an international 
level. 78 
What remains then are possibilities under general national 
tort law to assert claims directly against the Galileo entities, in 
spite of the fact that this means circumventing existing and ap- 
plicable liability regimes. In other words, a passenger (con- 
76 See Rome Convention, supra note 49. 
77 See The European Equation, supra note 75, at 240-245. 
" Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products, 85/374/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 210129); and Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states concerning liabil- 
ity for defective products, 1999/34/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 141120). 
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sumer) damaged by an aircraft accident may not wish to sue the 
airline (end-user) under contractual liability through D. But 
when convinced that the ultimate cause of the accident is a 
wrongful or absent Galileo signal or service, the passenger will 
directly address the Company through torvthird-party liability 
law. 
This would refer especially to E-1 and E-2, where the dis- 
tinction between them would justify different arguments being 
applied to them. Regarding the open access signals used for the 
open service under E-1, there is no contract. Regarding the 
closed access signals used for the commercial services, safety-of- 
life services and public-regulated services under E-2, there is a 
contract between key players. It is for existing national rules 
and practices on tort law and third-party liability to be the basis 
for whether and to what extent claims under E-1 and E-2 would 
then have to be rejected by courts. 
The Company could therefore only deal with liability issues 
in the context of service guarantees. This depends upon the ex- 
tent to which offering liability reimbursement in case the Gali- 
Leo service could be blamed for damage would be a feasible and 
interesting proposition. The Authority, the Concession Agree- 
ment, and possibly a Galileo Convention would be important in 
defining the respective roles of the Authority and member states 
in such arrangements. An international compensation h n d  
similar to the ones used in cases of oil pollution79 and by the nu- 
clear power industry8' is an option worth considering." Such 
'' International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; and the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 
U.N.T.S. 57; both amended by the International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 
to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 18 December 1971, Nov. 27, 1992, 
U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 87; Cm 2657; ATS 1996 No. 3 (entered into force 30 May 1996). 
en Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris, July 
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1968); and the Convention Supple- 
mentary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 685 (1963); both as amended by the Convention 
on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 12, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1473 
(1997) (not yet entered into force). 
'' See e.g., Sean. D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes for the Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AM. J. INTL L. 24 , 5 6  (1994). 
20041 LIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR GPS AND GALILEO 157 
arrangements are a matter for negotiation between the Galileo 
Joint Undertaking (GJU), established by the European Com- 
mission and ESA inter alia to develop the concession for the fu- 
ture Company,82 and the prospective concessionaire in the bid- 
ding process, as well as a matter of commercial policy for the 
concessionaire once the bidding process is over. 
As between the various Galileo services subsumed under B 
in the generic Model, the major distinction between commercial 
services, safety-of-life services and public-regulated services lies 
in the measure of involvement of governmental authorities. This 
translates into issues of sovereign immunity possibly being in- 
voked when it comes to liability for the safety-of-life services 
and the public-regulated services. 
SAR services are a different issue. The role of Galileo, the 
GCS and the Company will be confined to contributing to an 
existing system, which means basically accepting the legal 
framework already been developed throughout the life of the 
COSPAS-SARSAT system. Even the role of local elements is 
fundamentally circumscribed by that framework, including any 
issues of liability. Thus, charting liability onto the Galileo Model 
and the inclusion of local elements shows the limits of what con- 
tracts can arrange in terms of contractual versus non- 
contractual liability as well as the special role of product liabil- 
ity, which largely depends upon the actual role of the Company 
and local elements in terms of producing or selling products. 
VII. LIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY OF GPS AND GALZLEO 
The final issue to be discussed concerns that of "interopera- 
bility", that is, the fact that GPS and Galileo to a considerable 
extent will provide for signals and services which can be used by 
the same user. "Interoperability" in this context does not mean 
the operational, economic, institutional or legal integration of 
the satellite systems. Although previously considered a possible 
option, the scenario of GPS and Galileo, and possibly 
GLONASS, evolving into one second generation system with 
See Council Regulation 876/2002JEC, supra note 9. 
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shared responsibilities, liabilities and competencies, has been 
abandoned.= 
Therefore, for "interoperability" to have meaningful content 
in the present context, it shall not presume that either A or B 
will be jointly provided. What "interoperability" then refers to, 
for the purposes of this paper, is the receiver level, that is, in 
first instance with the value-added service providers and end- 
users. Value-added service providers may receive both the A 
from GPS and A or B from Galileo subject to the various appli- 
cable conditions and integrate them into the service C delivered 
to the end-users. Similarly, these end-users may wish to benefit 
from both at  the same time for their own usage, whether these 
end-users are providing services to consumers or not. 
This is illustrated by Figure 5 (Appendix 5), reflecting at  
the same time the provision of signals and services, and the li- 
ability relationships attached to them.84 For reasons of clarity, 
as well as the indirect relevance of product liability for interop- 
erability, some of the F-arrows have been shortened. They 
should be read as extending as far as they did in Figures 2 (Ap- 
pendix 2) and 4 (Appendix 4). Here, GPS and EGNOS have been 
specifically mentioned next to Galileo as examples of basic sig- 
nal providers and augmentation providers. 
As a consequence of this paper's definition of "interoperabil- 
ity", the generic liability charts depicted for GPS (Figure 2, Ap- 
pendix 2) and Galileo (Figure 4, Appendix 4) will continue to 
apply in the case of GPS-Galileo interoperability (Figure 5, Ap- 
pendix 5). GPS will continue to provide A, just as Galileo will 
provide A and B, the difference being that they are now being 
received by the same receiver simultaneously. This is likely to 
be transparent to the value-added service provider or end-user. 
It is unlikely that either would be interested in such visibility 
either, until liability (and hence, for Galileo, service guarantees) 
would become an issue. 
The extent to which the U.S. authorities would accept li- 
ability for GPS-related accidents remains as described above. 
This liability is a U.S. domestic matter: claims have to be enter- 
83 See, e.g., Schubert, supra note 8, at 248-50. 
84 See Recommendations and Conclusions, supra note 10, at 108. 
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tained in U.S. courts in accordance with U.S. law. The possibil- 
ity to sue the U.S. government successfully meets with some 
severe statutory and practical limitations. Therefore, arguably 
the U.S. authorities perhaps may not be expected to put a lot of 
effort into distinguishing GPS input from Galileo input unless 
they would perceive a substantial risk of being held liable for 
cases of damage where the respective inputs from GPS and 
Galileo would not be clearly distinguishable. Of course, GPS 
being a national U.S. asset, in the absence of any contract, U.S. 
authorities are fully entitled to ensure that only national re- 
gimes and procedures can be used for claiming liability for dam- 
age ultimately caused by GPS, and resist any call for wider li- 
ability-acceptance such as, for example, by means of a GNSS 
Convention. It is then, equally obvious, for any potential user to 
determine his own risks in doing so, and if such risks are con- 
sidered unwarranted, to desist from using GPS. 
Similarly, the authorities under which the Company resorts 
to may limit its (non-contractual) liability to that imposed by 
the relevant national regimes, which will be the case for the 
open service. By contrast, for the contractual services, it is cur- 
rently assumed that under the concession the Company should 
accept a certain additional liability through the contract, but 
not confined to contractual liability-proper. Apart from such 
contractual liability, the contracts with value-added service pro- 
viders should, under current assumptions, allow for derogation 
of non-contractual liability. For those reasons, the Company 
should ensure that its input to a dual receiver is recognisable, in 
order not to risk paying compensation when GPS would be re- 
sponsible for damage. 
There is an additional issue of non-contractual tort liability 
at  stake here. Circumventing any contract, whether concerning 
GPS or Galileo, third-party claimants may wish to ignore the 
contractual chain, which would cause them to sue only the 
value-added service providers or end-users that directly caused 
the damage and instead assert a claim directly against the sig- 
nal provideds). Leaving aside the question of the possibilities in 
any legal system to have such a claim accepted, such a case 
would require Galileo to prove that in the "interoperation" of 
GPS and Galileo signals and services it is the GPS input that 
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was responsible, if the CompanyIGCS is to avoid paying unjust 
compensation. This would amount to a serious defence in court, 
and the issue of evidentiary value of technical means of moni- 
toring. 
Whilst the A and B of GPS and Galileo may "interoperate" 
at  the receiver level, by the time it comes to C, the respective 
inputs of GPS and Galileo are indistinguishable. Nor need they 
be distinguishable from a legal, including a liability, perspec- 
tive. C, being a matter of contract, is for the contracting parties 
to decide whether they want to deal with such interoperation, or 
not. This is the more likely case because the end-user is more 
interested in being provided with a certain service rather than 
in knowing the technical requirements of the service. The Com- 
pany might be interested in ensuring that also on liability the 
benefits of using Galileo will partly accrue to both contracting 
parties, by ensuring in its contracts with any of those that any 
liability within C may be derogated to the Galileo Core System 
to the extent Galileo is ultimately to blame for the damage at  
issue. 
Going still further down the chain of relevant relationships 
and ensuing liabilities as illustrated by Figures 2, 4 and 5, Ap- 
pendices 2 , 4  and 5) as a consequence of the foregoing, neither in 
D, nor in E, nor in F does any "interoperation" of GPS and Gali- 
Leo at the receiver level have any impact on liability as different 
from liabilities which would anyway exist. D concerns a contrac- 
tual liability, which would at  best lead Galileo to undertake the 
same derogation offer to be provided regarding C, as described 
above. E concerns non-contractual liability; but where it con- 
cerns E-3, E-4 and E-5, mutatis mutandis the same applies: ap- 
plicable derogation could be offered through the contractual 
chain. 
On the other hand E-1 and E-2 apply to a pre- 
interoperation phase, where consequently the issue of interop- 
erability-liability is not posed. At the same time, both E-1 ar- 
rows are similar in referring to open access signals in the con- 
text of which contracts are totally absent. Whereas both E-2 ar- 
rows refer to controlled access signals where contracts, namely 
under various versions of B, would crucially be at  issue. This 
distinction may have a bearing on whether liability claims along 
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these lines would be easily accepted in the presence of other 
possibilities or absence thereof to sue under A or B. 
Finally, F concerns product liability, and to the extent nei- 
ther GPS nor Galileo have a role in manufacturing the involved 
products, this kind of liability will not be a relevant issue. In 
case manufacturers would be directly contracted by the Galileo 
Core System to manufacture hardware, the situation again be- 
comes similar to the previous ones: product liability resting on 
the manufacturer not going away merely because of such a con- 
tract, the contract may be used by the Galileo Core System for 
offering derogation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As the analysis and Model have shown, under current law 
the situation with respect to liability for global navigation satel- 
lite systems operations is still fairly simple at the abstract level, 
that is, which liability regimes might or do apply. However, 
statements of certainty might have to wait until a proper case 
which represents a first instance where various national re- 
gimes, basically of all states on whose territory or by whose citi- 
zens global navigation satellite systems services are made use 
of. It may be expected however that for GPS, no contractual li- 
ability would be accepted, whereas in the absence of interna- 
tional treaties stipulating otherwise non-contractual liability 
claims would only be possible under U.S. tort law, where the 
few statutes mentioned would severely limit the possibilities for 
successful claims in this respect. 
Even with GPS, however, that is not the full story, as from 
a civil perspective at  least the applications downstream are 
more important. This is where the area of sector-specific liabil- 
ity regimes become relevant such as, the largely international 
one of contractual liability and the partly international one of 
third-party liability in air law. Whilst for GPS authorities such 
liabilities may be less relevant, for the measure of interest in 
the downstream applications sectors such liabilities to a consid- 
erable extent determine the interest, feasibility and ultimately, 
perhaps, the commercial viability of using GPS. 
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That is where Galileo will come in, representing a quantum 
leap in operational as well as legal complexity precisely. Be- 
cause for Galileo, contrary to GPS and as evidenced also by the 
private operator in the centre of the Galileo institutional struc- 
ture, a major justification for its future existence lies in attract- 
ing and serving downstream applications: aviation and other 
transport sectors as well as telecommunications, leisure activi- 
ties, urban planning, banking and suchlike. 
Dealing with liability in a customer-oriented fashion is part 
of that approach. In principle, the Model applicable to the liabil- 
ity issues works no differently for Galileo than it does for GPS. 
Thus, for the open service, principally similar to GPS's SPS, no 
liability would be accepted other than general tort or third-party 
liability under applicable national regimes. For the other ser- 
vices, commercial services, safety-of-life services and public- 
regulated services, Galileo could have chosen the same ap- 
proach, but it likely will not. In order to entice downstream 
value-added service providers, end-users and ultimately also 
consumers properly speaking into using Galileo. It may be ex- 
pected Galileo will offer under relevant contracts and through 
service guarantees certain contractual liabilities to reimburse 
downstream contractual partners under applicable contractual 
or non-contractual liability regimes if they would be forced to 
pay for claims to their contractual partners, third-party victims. 
The damage leading to such compensatory payments has to be 
proven to have been ultimately caused by erroneous or absent 
Galileo signals. 
What this means in terms of substantive liability obliga- 
tions and consequences downstream, however, is a totally dif- 
ferent matter, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Such ob- 
ligations and consequences would depend on whether and how 
any of the plethora of relevant liability regimes would apply. 
This paper addresses a theoretical and general perspective of 
liability regimes relevant for any sector involved in any national 
jurisdiction where global navigation satellite system applica- 
tions would be feasible, plus a few international and European 
Community law-regimes. 
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Figure 1. The Legal/Functional Model of GNSS (GPS) signal 
and service provision. 
Basic signal 
providers 
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Appendix 1 
164 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW [vOL. 30 
Figure 2. The GNSS (GPS) LegaVFunctional Model and 
liability. 
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E = non-contractual liability (1 + 5 different versions) 
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Figure 3. The LegaWunctional Model of Galileo signal and 
service provision (generic and envisaged). 
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Figure 4. The Galileo LegalIFunctional Model and liability. 
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Figure 5. Interoperability of GPS and Galileo, and liability. 
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